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RENO v. ACLU: THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPT 
TO REGULATE PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 
FAILS FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, an estimated 200 million personal computer users will 
access the Internet on a regular basis.' In 1996, in an effort to regu-
late this new medium, Congress passed Title V of the Telecommuni-
cations Act, also known as the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA).2 Mter the CDA received presidential approval, forty-seven 
plaintiffs3 filed suit against the Attorney General of the United 
States and the Department of Justice.4 The plaintiffs alleged that 
sections 223(a)5 and 223(d)6 of the CDA were facially unconstitu-
1. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
2. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. CL 2329, 2337-38 (1997). 
3. See id. at 2339 nn.27-28. The 47 plaintiffs included organizations and corpora-
tions such as the National Press Photographers Association, American Civil 
Liberties Union, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, America On-
line, Apple Computer, CompuServe, Magazine Publishers of America, and 
Microsoft Corporation. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1998). This section provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Prohibited general purposes Whoever- (1) in interstate or foreign 
communications (A) by means of a telecommunications device know-
ingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission 
of, any comment request, suggestion, proposal, image or other com-
munication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, 
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person; (b) 
by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-(i) makes, cre-
ates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, 
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which 
is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communi-
cation is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of 
such communication placed the call or initiated the communication 
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his con-
trol to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the 
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, 
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
[d. 
6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp. 1998). This section provided in pertinent part: 
(d) Sending or displaying offensive material to persons under 18 
Whoever-( 1) in interstate or foreig!1 communications knowingly-(A) 
273 
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tional.7 The challenged provisions were aimed to protect individuals 
under eighteen years of age from receiving harmful communica-
tions over the Internet.s The plaintiffs asserted that sections 223(a), 
which prohibited knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent com-
munications to minors,9 and 223(d), which prohibited knowingly 
sending or displaying sexually explicit messages that were patently 
offensive to minors,1O violated their First Amendment free speech 
and Fifth Amendment due process rights}1 
Mter conducting an evidentiary hearing,12 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a pre-
liminary injunction preventing the government from enforcing both 
provisions. 13 The Government appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court.14 The issue before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether sections 223(a)and 223(d) of the CDA violated both the 
[d. 
uses an interactive computer service to send a specific person or per-
sons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer ser-
vice to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of 
age, any comment request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other 
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms pa-
tently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, 
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the 
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; 
or (2) Knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by para-
graph(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be 
fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. 
7. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Twenty plaintiffs filed 
suit immediately after the statute was signed by President William Clinton, 
challenging the constitutionality of both sections 223(a) and 223(d). See Reno, 
117 S. Ct. at 2339. The district judge entered a temporary restraining order, 
but only against the enforcement of section 223(a) as it applied to indecent 
communications. See id. Thereafter, twenty-seven plaintiffs filed a second suit 
challenging the same two provisions. See id. The two suits were consolidated 
and heard by a three-judge panel of the district court as permitted under sec-
tion 561 of the Act. See id. 
8. See Reno,117 S. Ct. at 2331. 
9. See supra note 5. 
10. See supra note 6. 
11. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849. 
12. See id. at 827. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. at 826. The Government directly appealed to the Supreme Court as per-
mitted by the statute. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 234041 (1997) (apply-
ing 47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. 199~». 
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First lS and Fifth 16 Amendments because of overbreadth and 
vagueness. 17 
The United States Supreme Court resolved the First Amend-
ment issue in Reno v. ACLU,18 Certain language in the statutory pro-
visions abridged the right to freedom of speech protected under 
the First Amendment. 19 The Court deemed the provisions facially 
unconstitutional,2o Finding the statutory provisions in violation of 
the First Amendment,21 the Court did not resolve the question of 
whether the vagueness of both provisions violated the Fifth Amend-
ment.22 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court announced that 
the Internet deserves the highest degree of protection against gov-
ernmental intrusion because it is the most participatory form of 
mass communication ever created.23 
In order to explain the Supreme Court's First Amendment in-
quiry in Reno, Section II of this Note details several past Supreme 
Court cases that establish the parameters from which the Reno 
Court worked to resolve the issue presented,24 as well as a history of 
the medium examined by the Reno Court-the Internet.25 In Section 
III, this Note summarizes the facts, opinion, and rationale of the 
Reno decision.26 Section IV critiques the Court's opinion and con-
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. This Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the ba-
sic freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly and the right to petition 
the government for redress of grievances. See id. 
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. This Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
[d. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces. or in the Militia. 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself; nor be deprived of life. liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
17. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341(1997). 
18. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
19. See id. at 2334. 
20. See id. at 2340. 
21. See id. at 2334. 
22. See id. at 234546. 
23. See id. at 2343. 
24. See infra notes 32-132 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 13~9 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 170-259 and accompanying text. 
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eludes that the majority reached the appropriate result.27 It was not 
surprising that the language of the CDA lacked the specificity and 
narrowness required by the First Amendment in light of the fact 
that Congress enacted a version of the CDA that was never the sub-
ject of a senatorial hearing, but merely discussed for approximately 
one hour on the Senate floor.28 Thereafter, Section IV of this Note 
explores Justice O'Connor's alternative approach taken in analyzing 
the CDA's provisions at issue in her concurring and dissenting opin-
ion.29 Section IV addresses the impact Reno had on Congress and 
the Executive, focusing particularly on the Internet Indecency Act:-
legislation passed in an effort to correct the constitutional infirmi-
ties of the CDA.30 This Note concludes that this newly enacted legis-
lation adequately revised the provisions struck down in Reno and ap-
pears constitutionally defensible.31 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. First Amendment Parameters 
The United States Supreme Court has reviewed numerous con-
stitutional challenges to government regulations of speech and ex-
pression.32 From this precedent, it is clear that courts must balance 
the government's interest in protecting its citizens from harmful, 
obscene, and indecent materials33 with the individual's interest in 
communicating or receiving communications.34 It is equally evident 
that the method of expression can have a decisive effect on the out-
come in a given case-the same speech protected in one mediuIil 
may not be protected in another.35 The challenge facing the Reno 
Court was balancing these interests in light of case precedent and 
27. See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text. 
28. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n.24 (1997). 
29. See infra notes 271-306 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 307-48 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 349-53 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 35-131 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 35-131, 170-259 and accompanying text. This interest is particu-
larly acute for minors. See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
34. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Wrginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 75fr57 (1976) (chronicling the Court's concern with the 
rights of receivers and concluding that "if there is a right to advertise, there is 
a reciprocal right to receive advertising"); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the CapttrJe 
Audience Doctrine, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q 85, 85 (1991) (noting the Court's 
long history of considering both speakers and potential listeners in First 
Amendment analysis). 
35. See infra notes 102-20. 
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applying this precedent to the Internet. Before dealing with the 
Court's analysis, it is instructive to consider the relevant precedent 
with which the Court dealt. 
1. Content-Neutral Regulations of Adult Material 
An initial inquiry in any First Amendment case centers on the 
government act that is allegedly abridging expression.36 The govern-
ment can proceed in two distinct fashions when it interferes with 
the marketplace of ideas.37 First, the government might attempt to 
regulate the content of the expression.38 Generally, content-based 
regulations of speech are viewed with greater contempt and height-
ened scrutiny by the courts.39 Alternatively, the government might 
create a restriction that is aimed at the time, place, and manner of 
speech, thereby appearing neutral as to the speech's content.40 
Courts will normally permit content-neutral regulations provided 
36. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Turt Liability, The First Amendment, and Equal Access to 
Electronic NetwOTks, 5 HAAv. J.L. & TECH. 65, 114 (1992) (explaining that a state 
action must exist to apply the First Amendment); see also Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment is applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
37. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) 
(observing that the state may regulate by either content-neutral or content-
based restrictions); Chase J. Sanders, Bearing the First Amendments Crosses: An 
Analysis o/State v. Sheldon, 53 MD. L. REv. 494, 504-05 (1994) (explaining that 
government regulations of speech are divided into two categories); see also 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986) (noting that the two 
categories of speech regulation are content-neutral and content-based). 
38. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-1, at 785 (2d 
ed. 1988) (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech). 
39. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 191 (1992) (holding that content-based 
restrictions must be subjected to exacting scrutiny); Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 n.6 (1989) (observing that content-based regulations 
must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny)(citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 
312, 321 (1988»; Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 
781, 798 (1988) (holding that a content-based regulation is subject to the most 
exacting scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that con-
tent-based restrictions must be subject to the most exacting scrutiny). 
40. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 196 (explaining that the Court has held that the gov-
ernment may regulate time, place, and manner of speech so long as the re-
strictions are content-neutral); Wanl, 491 U.S. at 791 (stating that the govern-
ment may impose reasonable restrictions based on time, place, and manner); 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (stating that time, place, and manner regulations are ac-
ceptable); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 
453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (explaining that the Court has recognized the valid-
ity of time, place, and manner restrictions). 
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. they are reasonable.41 Thus, content-based regulations are far more 
likely to fail First Amendment scrutiny than their content-neutral 
counterparts.42 However, a clear line of demarcation between the 
categories may prove difficult to support in certain situations. 
An illuminating illustration of this difficulty is City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc.43 In Renton, the Supreme Court was petitioned 
to resolve a First Amendment challenge to a city zoning ordinance 
prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from being located within 
1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or within one mile 
of any school.44 Playtime Theatres purchased two theaters in down-
town Renton, Washington, intending to use them as adult movie 
theaters.45 The theaters were located within the area regulated by 
the ordinance.46 Playtime Theatres sought injunctive relief and a de-
claratory judgment that the ordinance violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.47 
The Supreme Court determined that the ordinance was not di-
rected at regulating the content of the films shown in the theaters, 
but rather the secondary effects that these types of theaters tend to 
promote.48 The Court analyzed the ordinance as a content-neutral 
regulation because the predominant purpose underlying the ordi-
nance. was to curtail the deleterious secondary effects that adult the-
aters have on a neighborhood, not to restrain any particular type of 
communication.49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
heavily on the city council's "predominant interests" in enacting the 
ordinance which were deduced from the council's prolonged delib-
erationsso and stated intentions.51 The Court distinguished content-
41. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that state 
governments have the right to impose content-neutral restrictions); Wanl, 491 
U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (holding that the city's regulation is content-neutral and, 
therefore, valid under the First Amendment). 
42. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 
STAN. L. REv. 113. 134 (1981) (explaining that content-based regulations will 
be overturned in more instances than content-neutral restrictions). 
43. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
44. See id. at 44. 
45. See ilL at 45. 
46. See ilL 
47. See ilL 
48. See ilL at 47. 
49. See ilL at 46. 
50. See id. at 47 (noting that the lower court's finding of the city council's intent 
was "more than adequate to establish that the city's pursuit of its zoning inter-
ests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression."). Specifically, 
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based regulations from content-neutral time, place, and manner 
regulations.52 The Renton Court explained that content-based regula-
tions are presumed to violate the First Amendment because they 
chill expression of ideas or views,53 but content-neutral regulations 
are acceptable "so long as they are designed to serve a substantial 
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative ave-
nues of communication. "54 The Renton Court held that the ordi-
the city council referred the matter to the planning and development commit-
tee. See ilL at 44. The committee held public hearings, researched the exper-
iences of nearby Seattle, Washington, received advice from the city attorney's 
office as to similar developments in other cities, and made recommendations 
leading to the enactment of the challenged ordinance. See ilL 
51. See ilL at 48 (noting that the ordinance was designed to prevent crime, protect 
the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and preserve neighborhoods, 
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life). 
52. See id. at 4647. One commentator recognized the significance of this distinc-
tion as follows: "No longer will adult business location ordinances be analyzed 
under the strict scrutiny standard ... which establishes a presumption of con-
stitutional invalidity that the city must overcome. Instead, adult business loca-
tion ordinances will be analyzed by the rational basis standard, which raises a 
presumption of validity . . . ." Ronald M. Stein, &gulation of Adult Businesses 
Through Zoning After Renton, 18 PAC. LJ. 351, 352 (1987) (footnotes and inter-
nal quotations omitted). 
53. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 782 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that 
"[t]he Constitution in general does not tolerate content-based restrictions of, 
or discrimination against, speech"); RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382 
(1992) (observing that "content-based regulations are presumptively invalid"); 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U;S. 455, 462 (1980) (discussing a statute that completely 
banned all non-labor picketing, but exempted peaceful labor picketing at a 
place of employment, and concluding that the statute was a content-based reg-
ulation); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95, 98-99 (1972) 
(stating that a Chicago ordinance exempting peaceful labor picketing from its 
general prohibition on picketing next to a school was a content-based regula-
tion and opining that "above all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message. its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content"). 
54. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; see City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 791, 804-07, 812-15 (1984) (upholding a prohibition against post-
ing signs on public property as a valid time, place, and manner restriction due 
to the municipality's valid aesthetic concerns in limiting unpleasant forms of 
expression, and observing that people can still post signs outside of the city or 
within the city on private property); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("Expression, whether oral or written or 
symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions."). In Clark, the Court reasoned that such restrictions on speech are 
valid if they are justified in some way without referring to the content of the 
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nance served a substantial government interest-preserving the 
quality of urban life-and allowed reasonable alternatives for com-
munication.55 Therefore, the ordinance survived the First Amend-
ment challenge.56 
Commentators have criticized the Renton Court's conclusion 
that the ordinance at issue was content-neutral,57 in effect, agreeing 
with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that concluded the ordi-
nance was content-based.58 Additionally, commentators have drawn 
attention to a footnote in which Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, notes that "it is manifest that society's interest in protect-
ing this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser magni-
regulated speech, if the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and if the restrictions leave open alternative methods 
of communicating the speech in question. See Clam, 468 U.S. at 293; see also 
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
643, 647-48, 654-55 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota rule 
which required members of ISKCON to confine their distribution, sales, and 
solicitation activities to a fixed location at the state fair, reasoning that the 
rule was not content-based because it applied to all persons or organizations 
wishing to sell and distribute material and that the state had a valid interest in 
wanting to maintain the orderly movement of people at the fair, and noting 
that alternative forums of expression existed outside of the fairgrounds). 
55. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54. The Court noted that the ordinance left approxi-
mately 520 acres, which equaled five percent of Renton's land area, available 
for use as adult theater sites. See id. at 53. Laurence Tribe explains that deci-
sions such as "Renton may signal the willingness of some members of the 
Court to fashion rules for speech in public places which will try to accommo-
date the conflicting demands of individuals and communities to have govern-
ment shield each from intrusion by the other." TRIBE, supra note 38, at § 12-
19, at 950. 
56. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55. As Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, ex-
plained: "In our view, the First Amendment requires· only that Renton refrain 
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and 
operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily 
meets this requirement." Id. at 54. 
57. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 46, 104 
(1987) (referring to Renton as a "disturbing" exception to the Court's protec-
tion of free speech); Leading Cases, Restrictive Zoning of Adult Theaters, 100 
liAR. L REv. 190, 195 (1986) ("The Renton ordinance was a content-based reg-
ulation of the first order."). 
58 .. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, j., dissenting) ("The Court asserts that 
the ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult motion 
picture theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community, and this is simply a time, place, and manner regula-
tion. This analysis is misguided." (citation and footnote omitted». 
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tude than the interest in untrammeled political debate. '"S9 From 
this footnote, it appears that at least Justice Rehnquist would sup-
port the view that low-value speech, such as sexually explicit cinema-
tography, whether regulated in a content-based or content-neutral 
manner is less deserving of First Amendment protection.60 While it 
is unclear whether this generalization is supported by a majority of 
the Court, cases demonstrate that when indecent communication 
rises to the level of obscenity, government regulations need not be 
content-neutral to survive a First Amendment challenge.61 
2. Obscene Material is not Protected by the First Amendment 
Legislative efforts aimed at restricting what is deemed obscene 
are not novel creations.62 When lawmakers suppress obscene mate-
rial, no violation of the First Amendment occurs because, as the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held, obscenity is not a form of speech 
worthy of First Amendment protection.63 While several attempts of 
59. See id. at 49 n.2 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 
70 (1976». 
60. See Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme Court's "Secondary Effects" Analysis in Free 
Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REv. I, 18 (1989); Stein, supra note 52 at 351 ("The 
Supreme Court's acceptance of the time, place, and manner analysis set forth 
by Justice Stevens in Young also signaled the Court's view that the type of ex-
pression at issue did not deserve the fullest protection."). 
61. See Prygoski, supra note 60, at 18. Delving into the reason why Justice Rehn-
quist "alluded to Young for the proposition that the kind of speech restricted 
by the Young and Renton ordinances was low-value speech, at least when com-
pared to the core first amendment speech of political debate," one commen-
tator observed: 
The only tenable conclusion is that the value of speech is related to 
the amount of first amendment protection the Court is willing to 
give it. Justice Stevens made this argument and it was rejected by a 
majority of the Court in Young. However, this argument appears to be 
part of Justice Rehnquist's premise as he analyzed the ordinance in 
Renton. 
[d. (footnotes omitted). 
62. See Martin Karo Be Marcia McBrian, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Prrr 
posing a Pornography Ordinance that Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 U. MICH. J-L 
REF. 179, 183-84 (1989) (tracing the history of laws restricting obscenity). 
63. See Randolph Stuart Sergent, The ''Hamlet'' FaUacy: Computer Netwurks and the Ge-
ographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HAsrINGS CoNST. L.Q 671, 681 (1996) 
(stating that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection 
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance," and therefore 
"not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,") (quoting 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957»; Bruce A Taylor, Hard-Core 
Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255. 255 (1988) 
(citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705(1986»; Roth v. United 
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defining what is obscene were crafted by earlier COUrts,64 the mod-
ern definition appears in Miller v. California. 6S 
In Miller, the Court analyzed the application of California's 
criminal obscenity statute66 to circumstances in which an individual 
sent sexually explicit material to "unwilling recipients who had in 
no way indicated any desire to receive such materials. "67 Miller con-
ducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" 
books.68 Included in this mass mailing were five unsolicited 
brochures sent through the mail to a restaurant in Newport News, 
California.69 The envelope was opened by the manager of the res-
taurant and his mother.70 Mter opening the unrequested envelope, 
the manager and his mother complained to the police.71 Mter a 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-86 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571-72 (1942». 
64. See Sergent, supra note 63, at 681 (stating that United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 
1093 (C.C.S.D.N.V. 1879), adopted the obscenity test used in the English case 
of Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R-Q.B. 360 (1868), which determined obscenity based 
on the effect the material would have on the most susceptible members of the 
population); Karo & McBrian, supra note 62, at 183-84 (explaining that early 
American courts applied the English Hinklin test which was subsequently aban-
doned and replaced by the definition of obscenity articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957»; Edward John Main, 
The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Politica~ ur 
Scientific Value, 11 S. Ill. U. LJ. 1159, 1159-60 (1987) (citing Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957». But 
see Sergent, supra note 63, at 681-82 (explaining that other courts such as 
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930), United States v. One Book En-
titled mysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), and United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 
(2d Cir. 1936), adopted a test that required the material to be judged by the 
dominant effect the allegedly obscene work would have on the average person 
in the community). 
65. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Karo & McBrian, supra note 62, at 184 ("The 
Court found the Roth language entirely unsatisfactory in practice, however, 
and replaced Roth II obscenity definition sixteen years later in Miller v. Califur-
nia.") (footnote omitted). 
66. The appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor of knowingly distributing ob-
scene material under California Penal Code § 311.2(a) & 311 (West 
1968)(amended 1969). See Miller, 413 U.S. at 16. 
67. Id. at 15. 
68. See id. at 16. The brochures that the appellant mailed primarily consisted "of 
pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of 
two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often 
prominently displayed." Id. at 18. 
69. See id. at 18. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
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jury trial, Miller was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited 
knowingly distributing obscene materials.72 Prior to this decision, 
the Court had never adopted a standard "to determiQe what consti-
tutes obscene, or pornographic material subject to regulation under 
the States' police power."73 As a result of this case, a majority of the 
Court agreed on "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core' pornog-
raphy from expression protected by the First Amendment. "74 
The Court focused on three criteria, each of which must be ful-
filled in order to deem a communication obscene.7s Focusing on 
the "average person applying contemporary community stan-
dards, "76 the Court first required the communication as a whole to 
solely appeal to sexual interest.77 The communication must also de-
pict or describe sexual conduct, specifically addressed by the state 
regulation, in a "patently offensive way. "78 The final consideration 
requires a court to determine if the communication "lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. "79 
The Miller Court affirmed the notion that states can pass laws 
that prohibit circulating obscene material when the method of dis-
persal creates a "danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling 
recipients or of exposure to juveniles. "80 The Court emphasized that 
72. See id. at 16 n.1. 
73. Id. at 22. 
74. Id. at 29. Although the Court described the criteria as "guidelines," it is clear 
that all three requirements must be fulfilled to render material "obscene" and 
thereby devoid of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 
2329, 2332 (1997) (referring to the "three-prong obscenity test set forth in 
Miller"). 
75. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957»). This requirement is often described 
as "the prurient interest." See id. 
78. Id. While the Court did not specifically define "patently offensive," it provided 
two categories of materials satisfying this standard: "(a) Patently offensive rep-
resentations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, ac-
tual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals." Id. at 25. 
79. Id. at 24. 
80. Id. at 18-19; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (noting that the 
Roth decision rejected the need to prove that viewing obscene matter would 
lead to unacceptable social conduct); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 
676, 690 (1968) (indicating that a state may regulate the access of certain 
materials to juveniles because of its strong interest in the deVelopment of chil-
dren); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63743 (1968) (stating that a state's 
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obscene material is not entitled to First Amendment protection.81 
Accordingly, the Miller Court developed standards for identifying 
obscene material, thus allowing states to prohibit the dissemination 
of material deemed "Miller obscene"82 without violating the First 
Amendment.83 What is Miller obscene to a child, however, is not 
necessarily Miller obscene to an adult. 
power to control the free flow of certain material to its children exceeds con-
trol over adults, and thus material not obscene to adults may still be found 
obscene to children and subject to regulation); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 
767, 769 (1967) (noting that the three cases consolidated in this action did 
not involve obtrusive publication so as to make it "impossible for an unwilling 
individual to avoid exposure" to the material in question); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (recognizing that states have a legitimate interest in 
stopping the free flow of harmful material to children); see also Rabe v. Wash-
ington, 405 U.S. 313, 317 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring) (observing that a 
movie screen depicting sexual acts was visible to motorists passing by the thea-
ter and to minors watching the film from outside the fence surrounding the 
theater; thus, the First Amendment would likely not prevent a state from regu-
lating such displays); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 36~1 (1971) 
(opinion of Marshall, J.) (noting that the government cannot exercise its 
power to protect minors and unwilling recipients of sexual material until pub-
lic or commercial distribution occurs because until then it is in private posses-
sion and threatens neither children nor anyone else); Breard v. Alexandria, 
341 U.S. 622, 64445 (1951) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited the 
sale of periodicals door-to-door at private residences, without the prior con-
sent of the homeowner or occupants, did not abridge the First Amendment 
because the community felt this sort of salesmanship was irritating to home-
owners who did not desire subscriptions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 
(1949) (validating an ordinance that protected local home and business own-
ers from the use of sound trucks which emitted loud noises); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944) (affirming the constitutionality of a state 
statute forbidding distribution of religious material by a minor on the streets); 
cJ. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 382-84 (1957) (noting that a state cannot 
place a total ban on material which is not obscene to adults simply because it 
is obscene to minors); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) 
(holding that motion pictures fall within First Amendment protections and 
even if they possessed "a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the 
youth of a community," it would not follow that they should be disqualified 
from First Amendment protection); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 
451, 4~5 (1952) (stating that activities do not warrant any type of limitation 
when such activities do not burden the general public's "convenience, com-
fort and safety"). 
81. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. 
82. See Michael I. Meyerson, Impending Legal Issues for Integrated Broadband Networlu, 
3 U. FLA. J.L & PUB. POL'y 49, 55 n.29 (1990) ("Legal obscenity is frequently 
referred to as 'Miller obscene. "'). 
83. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 20. 
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3. A Lower Threshold of Obscenity Exists for Minors 
In 1968, the Court reviewed Ginsberg v. New YorJtI4 to determine 
the constitutionality of a New York criminal obscenity statute.8S The 
statute prohibited selling material to minors defined to be obscene 
on the basis of its appeal to minors, whether or not it would be ob-
scene to adults.86 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, 
the Court rejected the defendant's broad argument that "the scope 
of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to 
read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend 
on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor. "87 
Ginsberg and his wife operated a stationary store and lunch-
eonette in Long Island, New York.88 Along with providing food ser-
vices to customers, Ginsberg sold numerous magazines, including 
some described as "girlie magazines. "89 On two separate occasions, 
Ginsberg sold a sixteen-year-old boy a pornographic magazine90 and 
was prosecuted pursuant to a New York statute.91 
By concluding that the statute did not invade the area of free-
dom of expression that the Constitution grants to minors,92 the 
Court affirmed the state's authority to adjust the meaning of ob-
scenity according to what appeals to the sexual interests of minors.93 
84. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
85. See id. at 621 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484-h (McKinney 1909) (current version 
at N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21 (1967». 
86. See ill. at 631. 
87. [d. at 636. The defendant store owner insisted that denying section 484-h ma-
terial to minors, insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of 
age or older, constituted a violation of the First Amendment. See id. 
88. See id. at 631. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See ill. 
92. See id. at 637. For examples of statutes that did interfere with this right, see, 
e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(holding a statute compelling children, against their religious beliefs, to salute 
the American flag unconstitutional); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534-36 (1925) (holding an Oregon statute that interfered with children's at-
tendance at private and parochial schools unconstitutional); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (holding a Nebraska statute forbidding chil-
dren to study modern languages other than English unconstitutional). 
93. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638; see also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 
(1966) (stating that the prurient-appeal requirement will be adjusted to "social 
realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in 
terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group"); 
Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668,671 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that the 
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Therefore, "even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 
'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches 
beyond' the scope of its authority over adults."'94 The Court justified 
this regulatory paternalism over minors on the grounds that each 
state "has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth,"9S 
and that parents are not always capable of controlling what their 
own children read.96 
The Ginsburg opinion signaled the Court's acceptance of the 
"variable obscenity approach."97 This approach recognizes the legiti-
mate interests states have in fashioning statutes that create a lower 
threshold of obscenity for younger audiences.98 Even though states 
are permitted to redefine obscenity for minors, courts must con-
tinue to analyze the constitutionality of these statutes with limiting 
principles in mind. These limiting principles are overbreadth and 
vagueness.99 
In particular, the concept of overbreadth prevents the govern-
ment from denying the general public access to materials simply be-
cause they could be inappropriate for minors. loo The Court has ex-
plained that to restrict the general population to that which is 
appropriate for children, would be "'to bum the house to roast the 
pig. "'101 This concern creates unique considerations for the Court 
when it reviews cases dealing with methods of speech outside of the 
traditional realm of print media. 
definition of obscenity may depend solely upon to whom the material in ques-
tion is directed). 
94. Ginsberg, 390 V.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 V.S. 158, 170 
(1944». In Prince, the Court upheld the conviction of the guardian of a nine-
year-old girl for violating the Massachusetts child labor law by permitting the 
girl to sell religious tracts for the Jehovah's Witnesses on the streets of Boston. 
See id. at 638-39. 
95. Id. at 640. 
96. See id. (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965) (Fuld, J., 
concurring) which struck down the first version of § 484-h of the New York 
Penal Law on grounds of vagueness). 
97. See JOHN E. NOWAK &: RONALD D. ROTUNDA. TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 
§ 16.61 (b), at 1205 (2d ed. 1992). 
98. See Kevin W. Saunders, Elo:tTonic Indecency: Protecting Childnm in the Wake of the 
Cable and Internet Cases, 46 DRAKE L REv. 1, 34 (1997) ("Variable obscenity al-
lows consideration of the audience in determining whether material is ob-
scene and prohibiting the distribution of obscene material to that particular 
audience. ") . 
99. See NOWAK &: ROTUNDA, supra note 97, § 16.61(b), at 1205. 
100. See ill. 
101. Id. § 16.61 (b), at 1206 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 V.S. 380,383 (1957». 
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4. Indecent Broadcasting Can Be Prohibited 
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. I02 The Court reviewed the constitutional-
ity of a declaratory order issued by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) 103 pursuant to its congressionally authorized 
power to regulate indecent public broadcasting under 18 U.S.C. § 
1464.104 Section 1464 forbade the use of "any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communications."I05 The Court 
explained that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting 
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection"l06 
and ultimately concluded that the FCC could prohibit indecent 
broadcasting. 107 
Pacifica involved the broadcast of comedian George Carlin's in-
famous monologue entitled "Filthy Words."I08 The New York radio 
station owned by Pacifica Foundation played the monologue one af-
ternoon at about 2:00 p.m. loo A man who heard the broadcast while 
driving with his son complained to the FCC that this type of mono-
logue should not have been broadcast on the public airwaves. llo 
The FCC issued a declaratory order stating that if any more com-
plaints about the broadcast were filed, it would decide whether to 
impose sanctions against the station for airing it. 1\1 
The Pacifica Court explained that governmental acts which reg-
ulate the content of speech are not automatically violative of the 
First Amendment. 112 The First Amendment analysis of speech regu-
102. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
103. Created by the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC regulates interstate and 
foreign communications by wire and radio in the public interest. See BLACK'S 
LAw DIGnONARY 610 (6th ed. 1990). The regulatory power of the FCC includes 
radio and television broadcasting, telephone, telegraph, cable television opera-
tion, two-way radio and radio operators, and satellite communication. See id. 
104. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. at 729. 
109. See id. at 729-30. 
110. See id. at 730. 
Ill. See id. The Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that 
the order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the event 
that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide 
whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by 
Congress." Id. 
112. See id. at 744. 
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lations requires a court to examine both the content and context in 
which the speech occurred.113 The Court found that because the 
content of Pacifica s broadcast was vulgar, offensive, and shocking, it 
was not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection in all situa-
tions.114 Of more noteworthy significance, however, was the Court's 
review of the context in which the monologue was communicated 
to others. lIS 
The Court primarily based its context analysis of broadcast me-
dia on two characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of 
communication}16 First, broadcast media permeate the privacy of 
homes, "where the individual's right to be left alone plainly out-
weighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."ll7 The second 
113. See id. The Court quotes this analysis as first articulated by Mr. Justice Holmes 
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants 
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within 
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends 
upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man 
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect 
of force . . . . The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevenL 
Id. at 52. 
114. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747. 
115. See id. at 747-48. The importance of context is illustrated by Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). In Cohen, Paul Cohen entered a Los Angeles court-
house wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." See ill. at 16. After 
entering the courtroom, he took the jacket off and folded it. See ill. at 19 n.3. 
The evidence showed no violent reaction to the jacket by anyone in the court-
room. See id. at 16. Nonetheless, when he left the courtroom, Cohen was ar-
rested, convicted of disturbing the peace, and sentenced to 30 days in prison. 
See id. The Court held that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on Go-
hen for his political statement in a public place because there was no evi-
dence showing his "speech" offended unwilling viewers, especially since no 
one objected to it. See ill. at 22. 
116. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
117. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970». The Court 
stated: 
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior 
warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unex-
pected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense 
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like say-
ing that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. 
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characteristic is the accessibility of the broadcasts to children. l1s 
This accessibility arid the previously legitimized Ginsberg paternalism 
justified upholding the FCC's order. 119 While no Court has expressly 
held, commentators have observed that opinions such as Pacifica 
represent an attempt to create a middle tier of constitutional pro-
tection for offensive, but non-obscene speech when the context is 
broadcast media. 12o Another mode of communicating indecent 
speech that has been the subject of regulatory restrictions is the 
dial-a-porn industry. 
One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does 
not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that 
has already taken place. 
[d. at 74849. 
118. See id. at 749. 
119. See id. at 750. However, the Court noted: 
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our 
holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation be--
tween a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan 
comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either 
setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast 
would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission's decision 
rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-
important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. 
The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The content of 
the program in which the language is used will also affect the com-
position of the audience, and differences between radio, television, 
and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant. 
[d. Commentators have called into question the legitimacy of the FCC's inter-
est in preventing this type of inadvertent exposure to children. See TRIBE, supra 
note 38, § 1218, at 937. Laurence Tribe reasons that the likelihood that chil-
dren would be exposed to the particular program was minimal because most 
children would be at school at the time the program aired and the station ca-
tered to a distinct adult audience. See id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 97, § 16.18(a), at 1033 ("The Court did not explain why it did not as-
sume that children old enough to understand the Carlin monologue were 
more likely to be in school in the early afternoon."). Outside of the Court's 
two justifications for according broadcasting the most limited First Amend-
ment protection of all other media, a majority of Justices "could not agree on 
the constitutional rationale for their holding." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
97, § 16.18(a), at 1034. 
120. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-18, at 938 ("Although the COurt has clearly 
embarked on the task of erecting a hierarchy of expression within the First 
Amendment, it is important to note that no Court has yet squarely held that 
offensive or sexually explicit but non-obscene speech enjoys less than full First 
Amendment protection."). 
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5. Indecent Dial-A-Pom Can be Regulated, but not Banned 
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided the most analogous case 
to Reno--Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC. 121 Sable Com-
munications began providing sexually explicit, pre-recorded tele-
phone messages through Pacific Bell. 122 Sable sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief against enforcement of section 223(b) of the 
Communications Actl23 which banned all indecent and obscene in-
terstate "dial-a-porn" telephone messages.124 In affirming the district 
court,l25 the Supreme Court held that the statute was not narrowly 
tailored to only protect children from exposure to indecent 
messages. 126 Although acknowledging that "[s]exual expression 
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amend-
ment, "127 the Court concluded that the government may regulate 
the content of indecent speech to serve a compelling interest. 128 
121. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
122. See id. at 117-18. Sable Communications charged a fee to people who accessed 
the messages, which Pacific Bell collected and divided between itself and Sable 
Communications. See id. at 118. 
123. See id. The Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of section 223(b) of 
the Communications Act of 1934. See id.; 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) (1)(A) (1982 & 
Supp. V 1988). The company based its challenge on the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-18. Sable Communications wanted to 
enjoin the FCC and the Department of Justice from pursuing "any criminal 
investigation or prosecution, civil action or administrative proceeding under 
the statute. n Id. at 117. 
124. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 117. 
125. :rhe district court struck down the "indecent speech" provision of 47 U.S.C. § 
223(b), holding that the statute was overbroad and unconstitutional. See id. at 
118-19. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling on the constitu-
tionality of section 223(a) (1 )(A) 's prohibition on obscene messages, stating 
that the Court has "repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amend-
ment does not extend to obscene speech." Id. at 124; see, e.g., Paris Adult The.-
ater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that First Amendment protec-
tion does not extend to obscene speech). 
126. See Sabk, 492 U.S. at 126. In support of the district court's decision, the Court 
stated that Sabk, "like Butler, presents ... 'legislation not reasonably restricted 
to the evil with which it is said to deaL'" Id. at 127 (quoting Butler v. Michi-
gan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957». The Butler Court further held that a statute which 
made it an offense to make available to the general public material found to 
have a potentially harmful influence on minors was' insufficiently tailored 
since it denied adults their free speech rights by allowing them to read only 
what was acceptable for children. See Butler, 352 U,S. at 383. 
127. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
128. See id. The Court observed that to survive constitutional scrutiny, any regula-
tion promulgated to serve such an interest must be narrowly drafted so as to 
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The Court obseIVed that protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of minors from certain sexual material is a compelling in-
terest. 129 However, the Court concluded that the total ban on inde-
cent messages was unconstitutional'30 because less restrictive means 
were available to seIVe the government's interest without denying 
adults access to constitutionally protected messages. 131 The Court 
suggested that potential alternates included "credit card, access 
code, and scrambling rules [as] a satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem of keeping indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of 
minors. "132 These alternative means of shielding children from inaIT 
propriate communications were a focal point of the Reno decision. 
Prior to discussing screening methods for the Internet, however, it 
is necessary to define what the Internet actually encompasses and 
how it developed up to the Court's decision in Reno. 
B. History of the Internet 
The Internet originated in 1969 as the result of an experimen-
tal project of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), and 
was called ARPANET.133 Originally, the United States Government 
used ARPANET to link computers conducting defense-related re-
search.134 The network soon evolved from its defense-related re-
not unnecessarily interfere with the First Amendment right to exercise free 
speech. See itt. Specifically, the Court stated that "the Government may serve 
this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 'it must do so 
by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnec-
essarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.~ Id. (quoting Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,637 (1980), which is based on 
the Court's holding in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) 
and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978». 
129. See itt. This least restrictive means analysis, while not dispositive in Reno, cer-
tainly plays a part in deciding how best to regulate the Internet. 
130. See id. at 131. It is worthy to note the similarity between § 223(b) and the 
CDA provisions at issue in Reno. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828-29 
(1996) (explaining that CDA provisions at issue regulate indecent, obscene, 
and "patently offensive" communication employing a telecommunications de-
vice or an interactive computer service). Section 223(b) was introduced on 
the floor of Congress and no Congressman or Senator presented data with re-
spect to how often or to what extent minors could avoid any regulations and 
access dial-a-porn messages. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130. 
131. See itt. at 128. As the Court explained, 42 U.S.C. § 223(b), "as amended in 
1988, impose[d] an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate 
commercial telephone messages." Id. at 117. 
132. Id. at 128. 
133. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831. 
134. See id. 
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search ongms to serve universities, corporations, and individuals 
around the world. 13S Following this expansive evolution, the 
ARPANET became known as the "DARPA Internet" and later simply 
the "Internet. "136 
It is nearly impossible to determine the size of the Internet be-
cause no single entity administers it.137 However, reports show "that 
the Internet has experienced extraordinary growth in recent 
years."138 As of 1996, approximately 9,400,000 host computers were 
estimated to be . linked to the Internet, with sixty percent of these 
host comput.ers located in the United States}39 This estimate does 
not include the personal computers used to access the Internet, 
which brings the number of Internet users to as many as forty mil-
lion worldwide. l40 The total number of computer users who access 
the Internet was expected to reach 200 million by the year 1999}41 
Several methods of communicating information are available 
once a person gains access to the Internet. 142 These methods are as 
follows: (1) one-to-one messaging, such as electronic mail (e-mail), 
which allows· direct communications to another individual compara-
ble to sending a first class letter; (2) one-to-many messaging, such as 
listservs or mail exploders, which allows individuals interested in a 
particular subject to join a mailing list and communicate their 
messages to all other members of the mailing list simultaneously, 
analogous to a bulk mailer; (3) distributed message databases, such 
as newsgroups, which are similar to listservs inasmuch as they relate 
to particular areas of interest, but unlike a listserv, users simply ac-
cess the database when they desire to communicate with others 
about the subject matter; (4) real time communication, such as chat 
rooms, which allow two or more people to type messages to each 
other that almost immediately appear on the others' computer 
screens; and (5) remote information retrieval, such as the World 
Wide Web, which provides a global platform of online information 
that users access through search engines. 143 The World Wide Web 
approach to information retrieval is the most advance information 
135. See ill. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 831-32. 
138. [d. at 831. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 834. 
143. See id. 
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retrieval system and is "fast becoming the most well-known on the 
Internet. "144 For the most part, in each of the methods described 
above, users can transmit and receive text, audio, and visual 
images. 14S The ease of accessing sexually explicit material through 
anyone of the information retrieval methods is a major concern, 
particularly in light of the explosive growth of the World Wide Web. 
This problem arises because once someone posts sexually explicit 
material on the World Wide Web, the individual posting the mate-
rial is unable to prevent it from entering any specific community}46 
Thus, the Internet can be viewed as a network of networks-mean-
ing any information contained on a network connected to the In-
ternet has the capacity to be retrieved by any other linked 
network. 147 
Unlike radio broadcasts and television, sexually explicit commu-
nications over the Internet are much less likely to enter a person's 
home inadvertently.l48 Receiving information on the Internet re-
quires one to take "a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and 
directed than merely turning a dial. "149 Furthermore, almost all sex-
ually explicit materials "are preceded by warnings as to the con-
tenL "ISO One government witness testified, at an evidentiary hearing 
in Reno that "the 'odds are slim' that a user would come across a 
sexually explicit site by accident." lSI 
Individuals and commercial entities that communicate through 
the Internet have faced difficulties in setting boundaries on the ac-
cessibility of materials they make available to users. Several attempts 
have been made to develop methods of verifying the age of Internet 
users who access material through the various informational re-
trieval methods. IS2 However, when the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Reno, it believed 
there were no reliable means by which to screen the age of Internet 
users accessing information through any informational retrieval 
method, nor could anything be done to segregate Internet fora con-
taining sexual material into "'adult' or 'moderated' areas of cyber-
144. [d. at 836. 
145. See ill. at 834. 
146. See it! at 844. 
147. See it! 
148. See it! 
149. [d. at 845. 
150. [d. at 844. 
151. [d. at 844-45. 
152. See it! at 84549. 
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space. "153 The expansiveness of the Internet and the fact that it was 
unregulated led Congress to enact the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996. 
C. History of the CDA 
The Telecommunications Act of 19961S4 was an extremely broad 
piece of legislation promulgated by Congress. The purpose of the 
Act was "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order 
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American tele-
communications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of 
new telecommunications technologies."ISS The Act included seven ti-
tles, but the major provisions had nothing to do with the 
Internet. 156 
Six of the titles were the result of "extensive committee hear-
ings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by Commit-
tees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. "157 However, 
Title V, the CDA, contained provisions added either after the hear-
ings were completed or as amendments during floor debates. ls8 
Congress failed to thoroughly analyze the CDA and its potential ef-
fect on the Internet, and the result was a hastily drafted piece of 
legislation. ls9 The two statutory provisions challenged in Reno were 
offered on the floor of the Senate and each provision received an 
informal label. l60 Section 223(a), which prohibited knowingly trans-
mitting obscene or indecent communications to minors, was labeled 
the "indecent transmission" provision. Section 223(d), which pro-
hibited knowingly sending or displaying sexually explicit messages 
that were patently offensive to minors, was labeled the "patently of-
fensive display" provision. 161 
In order to curtail the reach of these two provisions, Congress 
enacted section 223 (e)( 5) .162 This provision provided two affirmative 
defenses for potential violators seeking to escape the reach of sec-
tions 223(a) and 223(d).163 One defense pertained to a person who 
153. Id. at 845. 
154. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
155. Id. 
156. See itl. 
157. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 (1997). 
158. See id. 
159. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
160. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338. 
161. See id. 
162. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (Supp. 1998). 
163. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. 
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had taken "'good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate ac-
tions' to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communica-
tions. "164 The second defense provided protection for "those who 
restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated 
fonns of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identi-
fication number or code. "165 Thus, Congress drafted what it believed 
to be a narrowly tailored law which provided sufficient defenses to 
prosecution in light of the Court's prior admonitions in Sable. l66 
Reno provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to consider 
the constitutionality of the CDA and its affinnative defenses, while 
defining its stance on Internet regulation. Prior to Reno, the Court 
dealt with legislative subject matter that included areas with exten-
sive histories of governmental regulation. 167 However, the Internet 
did not have this type of regulatory history and the CDA was the 
first attempt to regulate this medium of communication. l68 With the 
ever-increasing amount of Internet use in this country and the in-
creasing awareness of the Internet's communicative capabilities, 
Reno presented a ripe situation for the Supreme Court to express its 
opinion about Internet regulation. l69 
III. INSTANT CASE 
President Clinton signed the CDA on February 8, 1996.170 On 
the same day, twenty plaintiffs, led by the ACLU, filed an action in 
164. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.CA § 223(e)(5)(A) (1997». 
165. Id. (citing 47 U.S.CA § 223(e)(5)(B) (1997». 
166. See ilL For a discussion of Sable, see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text. 
167. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 ("Thus, some of our cases have recognized special 
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to 
other speakers.")(citations omitted); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters 
of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (holding that the constitutionality of broad-
cast regulations does not require that such regulations serve "compelling" gov-
ernment interests since broadcast regulation "involves unique considera-
tions"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (holding that "of 
all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most lim-
ited First Amendment protection" and the reasons for treating broadcasting 
differently are: (1) broadcasts reach people in the privacy of their own homes 
without prior warning and (2) broadcasts are available to children of all ages); 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (noting that the charac-
teristics of new media warrant different First Amendment analysis); NBC v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190,215 (1943) (upholding the FCC's authority to reg-
ulate radio communications beyond the engineering and technical aspects). 
168. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
169. See infra notes 170-270 and accompanying text. 
170. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. 
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin en-
forcement of sections 223(a) and 223(d) of the CDA.17I The case 
was assigned to Judge Ronald Buckwalter, and he proceeded to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing on February 15, 1996.172 Judge 
Buckwalter granted a limited temporary restraining order after find-
ing that section 223(a)(1)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. 173 As a 
result of this order, the CDA was not enforceable against any poten-
tial violators.174 When twenty-seven other plaintiffs filed the same 
constitutional challenge to the CDA, a threejudge court convened 
and consolidated the two cases. 175 
The parties stipulated to many of the facts involved and placed 
an extensive portion of their cases before the court by sworn decla-
rations at the consolidated hearings. 176 The plaintiffs targeted their 
constitutional challenge on section 223(a)(I)(B) and section 
223(d) (1) of the CDA.I'7 However, the plaintiffs made it clear that 
they did "not quarrel with the statute to the extent that it covers 
obscenity or child pornography, which were already proscribed 
before the CDA's adoption. "178 
The district court held that sections 223(a)(1)(B) and 
223(d)(l) were unconstitutional on their face under First Amend-
ment overbreadth and Fifth Amendment vagueness doctrines.179 
Therefore, the judgment of the district court enjoined the Govern-
ment from enforcing the "indecent" material prohibition in section 
223(a)(1 )(B), but "preserve[d] the Government's right to investi-
171. SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
172. See id. at 827. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. See id. at 827-28 & n.3. The plaintiffs in the first suit requested Chief judge 
Dolores Sloviter of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to 
appoint a three-judge court pursuant to section 561 (a) of the Communica-
tions Decency Act. See id. at 827. As is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284, judge 
Sloviter appointed such a court consisting of herself, judge Buckwalter, and 
judge Stewart Dalzell. See id. Soon after these events, the American Library A!r 
sociation, Inc. and an additional 26 plaintiffs filed a similar lawsuit against the 
Government. See ill. at 827-28 & n.3. On February 27, 1996, Chief judge 
Sloviter convened the same threejudge court and consolidated the two ac-
tions pursuant to FED. R CIV. P. 42(a). See id. at 828; see also supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
176. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828. 
177. See id. at 829. 
178. [d. 
179. See id. at 849. 
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gate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities 
prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of sections 
223(d)(l) and (2) [was] unqualified because those provisions con-
tain[ed] no separate reference to obscenity or child pornogra-
phy. "180 Although the district court's judgment was unanimous, each 
judge wrote a separate opinion. 181 
The Government appealed the order of the district court di-
rectly to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to section 
561 (b) of the CDA. 182 This provision mandated that, upon request, 
parties could appeal directly to the Supreme Court with a facial 
constitutional challenge to the CDA.183 Mter reviewing the provi-
sions of the statute and the opposing arguments presented by the 
parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision on 
First Amendment grounds without deciding whether the provisions 
violated the Fifth Amendment. l84 
The Court reviewed past decisions upon which the Government 
relied, analyzed the overbreadth of the CDA provisions at issue, and 
finally considered the Government's additional arguments concern-
ing affirmative defenses and the Act's severability clause. 18S The 
Court found the Government's reliance on past regulatory cases 
misplaced and the language of the CDA's provisions overbroad. l86 In 
striking down the challenged provisions, the Court relied on its 
time-honored tradition of protecting free speech under the First 
Amendment when a statute is not narrowly tailored to support a le-
gitimate government interest. 187 
A. Supreme Court Distinguishes Reno from Prior Cases 
In Reno, the Government argued that the CDA was constitution-
ally permissible under three of the Supreme Court's earlier cases. l88 
These cases were Ginsberg v. New yom, 189 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 190 
180. Id. 
181. See ilL at 857-83. 
182. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 234041. 
183. See 47 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1997). 
184. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341. 
185. See infra notes 188-270 and accompanying text. 
186. See infra notes 188-270 and accompanying text. 
187. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348. 
188. See ilL at 2341. 
189. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of Ginsberg v. New York. see 
infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text. 
190. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text. 
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and Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 191 Instead of providing support 
for the Government's position, the Court observed that these cases 
created serious doubt about the constitutionality of the CDA's 
provisions. 192 
1. Ginsberg Distinguished from Reno 
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New 
York statute that prohibited selling certain types of obscene material 
to minors. 193 The Reno Court reasoned that the statute in Ginsberg 
was narrower than the CDA in four different respects. l94 First, the 
Ginsberg statute did not prevent parents who wished to purchase the 
magazines for their children to do so, unlike the CDA, which would 
be applicable even if parents consented to their children receiving 
the material or supervised their children in obtaining the mate-
rial. 19S Second, the statute in Ginsberg applied only to commercial 
sales, unlike the CDA which contained no such limitation. l96 Third, 
the Ginsberg statute specifically defined the harmful material sought 
to be suppressed as "utterly without redeeming social importance 
for minors."I97 The CDA, on the other hand, failed to provide any 
definition of "indecent," which was employed in section 
223 (a) (1).198 In addition, the "patently offensive" standard used in 
section 223(d) failed to provide that such material must lack serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in order to fall within 
the statute. l99 Lastly, the Court npted that the New York statute de-
fined a minor as any person under the age of seventeen, but the 
CDA applied to persons under the age of eighteen,200 thereby in-
creasing itsreach.201 For these reasons, the Court rejected the Gov-
191. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., see also infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text. 
192. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341. 
193. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text. 
194. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341. 
195. See id. ("Under the CDA, by contrast, neither the parents' consent-nor even 
their participation-in the communication would avoid the application of the 
statute. "). 
196. See id. The Ginsberg statute applied only to situations where merchants sold 
magazines containing indecent materials to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 647 (1968). 
197. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 
(1968». 
198. See id. at 2341. 
199. See id. 
200. See id. 
201. By attempting to protect people 18 and under, the CDA in effect expands its 
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ernment's contention that the CDA was of a similar restrictive na-
ture to the Ginsberg statute. 
2. Pacifica Distinguished from Reno 
Thereafter, the Court compared its Pacifica decision with the 
instant case because of the Government's argument that Pacifica ap-
plied to the analysis of the CDA. 202 In Pacifica, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a declaratory order administered by the FCC 
against a radio station that broadcast a certain comedic mono-
logue.203 Again, the Court drew several distinctions between the 
Pacifica order and the CDA. 204 
First, the order in Pacifica applied to one specific broadcast, lOS 
unlike the CDA's prohibitions which were "not limited to particular 
times and [were] not dependent on any evaluation by an agency fa-
miliar with the unique characteristics of the Internet. "206 Second, 
the FCC's order was not punitive in any way, unlike the CDA which 
imposed criminal sanctions on violators.207 Lastly, the Pacifica order 
applied to radio broadcasts governed by the FCC, which historically 
"received the most limited First Amendment protection"208 because 
warnings could not protect listeners from offensive program con-
tent.209 In contrast, the Internet was not subject to any regulatory 
agency's evaluations concerning material transmitted through it. 210 
3. Renton Distinguished from Reno 
Lastly, the Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from 
its decision in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.211 The zoning ordi-
nance upheld in Renton had several distinguishing features from the 
coverage to a whole other segment of society that many see as adult. See id. at 
2346. 
202. See ill. at 2341, 2343. 
203. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text. 
204. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text. 
205. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342 ("[T]he order in Pacifica, issued by an agency that 
had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast 
that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program con-
tent in order to designate when-rather than whether-it would be permissi-
ble to air such a program in that particular medium."). 
206. [do 
207. See ill. 
208. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978). 
209. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342. 
210. See id. 
211. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text. 
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COA.212 The Renton ordinance focused on minimizing the deleteri-
ous secondary effects that adult movie theaters have on residential 
neighborhoods.213 The COA did not focus on any secondary effects 
that indecent or patently offensive material might have on children, 
but "applie[d] broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace."214 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that "the COA [was] a content-based 
blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, [could not] be 'prop-
erly analyZed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation, "'21S 
which was the analysis employed by the Court in Rentlm. 
B. Broadcast Media Distinguished from Internet 
To further distinguish its past justifications for subjecting the 
broadcast media to harsh regulation, the Court noted several differ-
ences between broadcast media and the Internet.216 These differ-
ences include the long history of governmental regulation" of broad-
cast media,217 the lack of available frequencies for broadcasters,218 
212. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 234243. 
213. See id. at 2342 ("The [Renton] ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the 
films shown in the theaters, but rather at the 'secondary effects'--such as 
crime and deteriorating property values--that these theaters fostered .... ") 
214. Id. 
215. Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 46). In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622 (1994), the Court stated that "[a]s a general rule, laws that by 
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of 
the ideas or views expressed are content based. By contrast, laws that confer 
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views 
expressed are in most instances content-neutral." Id. at 643 (citations omit-
ted). 
216. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
217. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding" that the 
history of the fairness doctrine and of related legislation demonstrates that 
the FCC's action did not exceed its authority, that in adopting the new regula-
tions, the FCC was implementing Congressional policy, and that the fairness 
doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political ed-
itorial rules do not violate the First Amendment). 
218. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 637 (holding that the appropriate standard by which to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the must-carry provision is the intermediate 
level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an inci-
dental burden on speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) 
(holding that a content-neutral regulation will be sustained "if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest"). 
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and the intrusive nature of broadcasting.219 The Court concluded 
that none of these factors were present in cyberspace and deferred 
to several of the district court's findings concerning the near impos-
sibility of a situation in which an Internet user would access sexually 
explicit material accidentally or unwillingly.220 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that prior 
Supreme Court case law failed to provide a compelling basis to sub-
ject the Internet to the watered-down level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that broadcast media endure.221 The Court then turned to 
the affirmative precedent that required it to strike down the CDA. 
C. Vagueness and the Miller Test 
The Court did not analyze the CDA under the Fifth Amend-
ment because it struck down the provisions on First Amendment 
vagueness grounds.222 Neither "indecent" nor "patently offensive" 
was defined by the statute and the Court opined that these terms 
would "provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two 
standards relate to each other and just what they mean. "223 As a re-
sult of this vagueness, the CDA was in fact a blanket content-based 
regulation of speech and would have a considerable chilling effect 
on free speech.224 Furthermore, the CDA threatened potential viola-
219. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,128 (1989). In Sa-
ble, the Court distinguished radio from telephone dial-a-porn: 
There is no "captive audience" problem here; callers will generally 
not be unwilling listeners. The context of dial-in services, where a 
caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is manifestly 
different from a situation in which a listener does not want the re-
ceived message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as turning 
on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message. Un-
like an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message re-
ceived by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so inva-
sive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding 
exposure to it. 
220. Id. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
221. See id. at 2344. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. (footnote omitted). 
224. See id.; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991) 
(holding that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, that prohibited a lawyer from 
making extrajudicial statements to the press that have a substantial likelihood 
of materially prejudicing an adjudication proceeding, was void for vagueness 
because the rule failed to provide fair notice to those at whom it was directed 
and was so imprecise grammatically that discriminatory enforcement was a 
real possibility). 
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tors with criminal sanctions.22S The Court reasoned that the uncer-
tainty of what material the statute covered, coupled with the threat 
of prosecution may deter people from communicating with one an-
other through words or ideas that mayor may not be unlawful.226 
The Government's response to this vagueness finding was that 
the statute was no more vague than the three-prong obscenity stan-
dard created by the Court in Miller v. Californit/,.227 The Government 
reasoned that q-te "patently offensive" standard of the CDA was in-
cluded in the second prong of the widely accepted Miller obscenity 
test; therefore, according to the Government, the resulting conclu-
sion must be that the COA was constitutionally defensible.228 The 
Supreme Court found the Government's reasoning 'flawed in several 
respects.229 
All three prongs of the Miller test work together to limit the 
reach of the obscenity standard.230 Thus, it would be incorrect to 
evaluate one prong without considering the others. The COA 
lacked any limiting language and created a greater danger of sup-
pressing speech that would otherwise lie beyond the reach of the 
Miller standard.231 When a statutory regulation affects constitution-
ally protected speech in an adverse manner, the Government must 
demonstrate that the regulation promotes a compelling interest and 
that the least restrictive means of furthering such interests are 
employed.232 
The Supreme Court concluded that in order for the COA to 
meet its intended purpose of denying minors access to sexually ex-
225. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45. 
226. See id. at 2345. 
227. See ill. (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973». In Miller, the 
Court reaffirmed Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), holding that ob-
scene material is not protected by the First Amendment. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 
36. 
228. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. 
229. See id. The Court concluded that the Government was incorrect because the 
second prong of the Miller test limited its reach to certain material "'specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law. '" Id. The CDA has no such require-
ment, which would have the effect of reducing the vagueness of "patently of-
fensive." Id. Furthermore, the Miller test is limited to "sexual conduct," while 
the CDA extends to "'excretory activities' as well as 'organs' of both a sexual 
and excretory nature." Id. 
230. See ill. ("Just because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it 
does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not 
vague."). 
231. See ill. at 2346. 
232. See Sable Communications of Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
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plicit material, it must suppress a plethora of speech "that adults 
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one an-
other. "233 In prior cases, the Court consistently held that speech 
which was indecent but not obscene was entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment as to the adult population.234 Protecting 
children from harmful materials is a valid governmental interest 
which has received repeated recognition by the Court.23S However, 
the interest in protecting minors never justifies "an unnecessarily 
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. "236 Thus, the 
Court agreed with the district court that the CDA was analogous to 
the dial-a-pom ban in Sable.237 
In Sable, the FCC argued that the Court "should defer to Con-
gress' conclusion about an issue of constitutional law. "238 The Court 
responded that "it is [the Court's] task in the end to decide 
whether Congress has violated the Constitution "239 and rejected the 
notion "that nothing less than a total ban would be effective in 
preventing enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent 
communications."240 As a result, the Sable Court declared that a con-
stitutional inquiry does not end merely because a statute serves a Ie-
233. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. 
234. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 
701 (1977) ("[W]here obscenity is not involved, [the Court has] consistently 
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not 
justify its suppression."). 
235. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (noting that certain busi-
nesses, such as movie theaters and book stores, may be prohibited from giving 
children access to indecent material); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 
(1968) (upholding a state statute that limited the availability of sexual material 
to minors because such material Was deemed to be harmful to the develop-
ment of minors). 
236. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. "[T]he Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult pop-
ulation ... to ... only what is fit for children.'" Id. (quoting Denver Area 
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2393 (1996) 
(quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 
(1989»). "[R] egardless of the strength of the government's interest' in pro-
tecting children, '[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be 
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.'" Id. (quoting Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983». 
237. See id. 
238. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129. 
239. Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that it is the 
responsibility of the judiciary to interpret the law). 
240. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. 
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gitimate government interest.241 The purpose of the statute must be 
served through the least restrictive means possible for it to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.242 
The Supreme Court distinguished the CDA from the statutes in 
Ginsberg and Pacifica because the least restrictive means of attaining 
the goal of the CDA were not used.243 The Ginsberg and Pacifica stat-
utes were tailored to meet their purposes in the least restrictive 
manner possible, whereas the CDA was not limited in any similar 
way. 244 As written, the CDA would prohibit access to 
"nonpornographic material with serious educational or other 
value"24s and would subject parents to a prison sentence for al-
lowing their children to access information on the Internet that the 
parents deem appropriate.246 Therefore, the CDA was a content-
based restriction on speech, and the Government had the burden 
of showing "why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective 
as the CDA. "247 
The Government could not prove that there were effective 
means, at a reasonably affordable price, for non-commercial speak-
241. See ill. ("[T]he mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted for 
the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to sexually ex-
plicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.") (footnote omitted). 
242. "As we pointed out last Term, that inquiry embodies an 'over-arching commit-
ment' to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its 
purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.'" Id. 
at 234647 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (holding that a statutory provision permitting a 
cable operator to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on 
leased access channels is consistent with the First Amendment, a "segregate 
and block" provision with respect to the leased access channels violates the 
First Amendment, and a provision permitting the operator to prohibit pa-
tently offensive or indecent programming on public access channels violates 
the First Amendment». 
243. See ill. ("Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of 
the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-
ended prohibitions embrace all non-profit entities and individuals posting in-
decent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the presence 
of minors."). 
244. See ill. 
245. Id. 
246. See ill. at 2348 ("Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman 
information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though 
neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the mate-
rial 'indecent' or 'patently offensive,' if the college town's community thought 
otherwise. "). 
247. Id. 
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ers to screen minors from "accessing material through e-mail.mail 
exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms. "248 Therefore, a great deal of 
adult communication on the Internet was hindered because of the 
all-encompass.ing language of the CDA.249 The Government simply 
failed to meet its burden and as a result the CDA, as written, was 
facially overbroad under the First Amendment.2S0 
The Government set forth several additional arguments in sup-
port of the constitutionality of the CDA, which were dismissed by 
the Court.25I In addition to these rejected arguments, the Govern-
ment suggested that the affirmative defenses provided in section 
223(e) (5)252 curtailed the statute's unconstitutional reach.2S3 How-
248. Id. at 2347 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996». 
249. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.- "These limitations must inevitably curtail a signifi-
cant amount of adult communication on the Internet." Iff.. "The breadth of 
the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented." Iff.. 
250. See ilL 
251. See ilL at 234849. These arguments included: (1) that the CDA was constitu-
tional because it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication; 
(2) that the plain meaning of the Act's "knowledge" and "specific person" re-
quirement restricts its applications; and (3) the Act's prohibitions are almost 
always limited to material lacking social value. See ilL at 2349. 
252. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (Supp. 1998). Section 223(e)(5) provided: 
(a) Defenses-In addition to any other defenses available by law ... (5) It is 
a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(I)(B) or (d) of this sec-
tion, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to the use of 
a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this section that a 
person-(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropri-
ate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by mi-
nors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may in-
volve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such 
communications, including any method which is feasible under available 
technology; or has restricted access to such communication by requiring 
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult 
personal identification number. 
Id. Finally, the Government argued that the CDA helps to encourage the 
growth of the Internet because people who refuse to subscribe to the Internet 
due to the pornographic material available to children would no longer have 
to worry about such a problem. Thus, the Government reasoned that this ar-
gument "provides an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of 
the CDA." Reno, 177 S.Ct. at 2351. However, the Court considered this argu-
ment the Government's weakest because it contradicted the district court's fac-
tual findings. See id. These findings indicated the recent, expansive growth of 
the Internet occurred regardless of the availability of sexual material on the 
Internet. See id. "The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated 
availability of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' material on the Internet is 
driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the risk of expos-
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ever, the Court concluded that the Government's suggestion of 
"tagging" sexually explicit transmissions per section 223(e)(5)(A) 
would be ineffective, and thus the defense was "illusory."254 Further-
more, the age verification defense provided by section 223(e)(5)(B) 
was not economically feasible for most non-commercial information 
providers to use, and therefore, the defense failed to sufficiently 
narrow the statute's burden on speech.2ss Ultimately, the Court 
agreed with the district court's conclusions that "the defenses do 
not constitute the sort of 'narrow tailoring' that will save an other-
wise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. "256 
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Government 
urged that the Court should honor section 608 of the CDA-the 
severability clause of the statute.2S7 The Court declined to do so as 
to section 223(d), opting to strike it down entirely because "inde-
cent" speech receives constitutional protection.258 The Court agreed 
to sever the phrase "or indecent" from section 223(a), leaving the 
remainder of section 223(a) intact because it related solely to ob-
scene speech which is not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.259 However, the Court concluded that the severability provision 
could do nothing else to save the remainder of sections 223(a) or 
ing themselves or their children to harmful material." [d. "The dramatic ex-
pansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this 
contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been 
and continues to be phenomenal." [d. 
253. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50. 
254. See id. at 2349. "Tagging" means that a person could "encode their indecent 
communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting 
recipients to block their reception with appropriate software." [do. At the time 
the case was before the district court, no such software was available. See id. 
255. See id. Age verification is currently used by commercial providers of sexually 
explicit material, and thus they would be protected by the statute. See ill. How-
ever, the Government failed to prove that the age verification actually pre-
cluded minors from casting themselves as adults. See id. "The Government 
thus failed to prove that the proffered defense would significantly reduce the 
heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive dis-
plays." [do at 2350. 
256. [do 
257. See 47 U.S.C. § 608 (1994). Section 608 provided: "If any provision of this 
chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held inva-
lid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to 
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." [do 
258. See ill. 
259. See ill. 
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223(d).260 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Discussion of Supreme Court s Holding and Rationale 
The Supreme Court did not strike down the entire CDA.261 In-
stead, the Court struck down the "indecent" and "patently offen-
sive" sections of the CDA because they were unconstitutionally over-
broad.262 However, the "obscenity" provisions of the CDA were not 
challenged and remain good law.263 In its holding, the majority olr 
served how the Internet existed at the time the case was before the 
Court.264 All of the Justices agreed that age-verifying gateway tech-
nology was not widely available, particularly for non-commercial in-
formation providers.26S It is not the Court's duty to forecast whether 
technical developments might occur in the near future or in the 
years or decades that follow.266 The majority's position is defensible 
inasmuch as it held that the CDA did not pass constitutional muster 
because it contained undefined terms, and more importantly, 
lacked narrowly tailored means to meet the governmental purpose 
of the statute.267 
However, one may accurately hypothesize that if the Court 
found that gateway technology was available to all Internet speakers 
when the case was before it, the CDA may have withstood the 
Court's First Amendment scrutiny. This type of technology could 
provide the Government with the narrowly tailored means necessary 
for legislation to survive strict scrutiny because it would make the 
statutory defenses effective for all information providers. Therefore, 
a question arises as to whether the Court genuinely intends to pro-
vide the Internet with such broad protection in the future. For ex-
ample, the Court affirmed in Reno that the Government has a valid 
interest in protecting children from harmful material.268 Therefore, 
access by minors to material on the Internet that is not obscene, 
260. See id. The Court also refused to limit its holding to a "judicially defined set 
of specific applications." [d. 
261. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 177. 
264. See supra notes 133-53 and accompanying text. 
265. Such software was not available, but Internet filtering software for information 
receivers was available. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349. 
266. See id. 
267. See supra notes 222-50 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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but still harmful to them, can be regulated if the legislation con-
taining these restrictions is appropriately drafted by Congress. 
In enacting the CDA, Congress simply did not research the 
myriad of issues involved with such an expansive regulation.269 The 
provisions were not the result of any Congressional hearings, and 
thus no legislative findings existed to provide factual support for the 
CDA.270 In failing to draft clear, concise constitutional legislation, 
the Court once again sent a message to Congress that ill-prepared 
legislation will not be tolerated when it unduly restricts information 
flowing to and from the marketplace of ideas.271 
B. Alternative Approach 
The Reno decision was not without a differing viewpoint. Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
with the majority opinion.272 Justice O'Connor concluded that the 
"indecent" provision of the CDA was not unconstitutional on its 
face.273 Her opinion began with the observation that section 223(d) 
was really two separate provisions and labeled them as the "specific 
person" provision and the "display" provision.274 She reasoned that 
each provision deserved a separate constitutional analysis.27S Further-
more, she observed that the statute was not written to prevent 
adults from accessing indecent material, but rather "the undeniable 
purpose of the CDA [was] to segregate indecent material on the In-
ternet into certain areas that minors cannot access. "276 The legisla-
tion created "adult zones," and the Court has upheld analogous 
zoning legislation in the past, but only when they meet the require-
ments of the First Amendment.277 In Justice O'Connor's opinion, 
269. See supra notes 28 and 158-60 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 28 and 158-60 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 238-50 and accompanying text. 
272. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351-57 (1997) (O'Connor, j., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). 
273. See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
274. See ill. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
275. See ill. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
276. Id. 
277. See id. at 2353-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Many 
states have enacted legislation which in effect creates these adult zones. See, 
e.g., MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 416E (1996) (prohibiting minors in establish-
ments where certain enumerated acts are performed or portrayed); MD. ANN. 
CoDE art. 27, § 416B (1996) (denying minors access to speech deemed harm-
ful to minors). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Reno v. ACLU addressed whether sections 223 (a) (1) and 223(d) 
of the CDA impinged on the First Amendment rights of adults.349 
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the 
first governmental attempt to regulate pornography on the most ex-
pansive, technologically advanced mode of communication known 
to this day.3so The Supreme Court held that both sections 223(a)(1) 
and 223(d) were overbroad to the extent they covered undefined 
"indecent" material, and as a result violated the First Amendment 
because they could suppress constitutionally protected speech.3S1 
The Court recognized the importance of protecting minors 
from harmful material, but refused to "'reduc[e] the adult popula-
tion . . . to . . . only what is fit for children. "'352 This refusal reaf-
firms the principle that the government may regulate constitution-
ally protected speech, but only when such a regulation serves a 
legitimate government purpose and is narrowly tailored by the least 
restrictive means available.3S3 Only time will tell whether the newly 
adopted Internet Indecency Act will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
However, it appears as though the government has taken adequate 
steps to assure that the Act will survive a constitutional challenge 
and has cured the defects present in the CDA that proved fatal to 
its intentions in Reno. 
Scott A. Shail 
younger. CompaTe 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1997) (CDA). with 47 U.S.C. § 
231(d)(7) (1999) (COPA). 
349. See supra notes 4-23 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra notes 17~270 and accompanying text. 
351. See supra notes 17~270 and accompanying text. 
352. Reno v. ACLU. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (quoting Denver Area Educ. 
Telecomms. Consortium. Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996) (quoting Sable 
Communications of Cal.. Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989»). 
353. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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the Court should uphold this type of zoning law "if (i) [the stat-
ute] ... does not unduly restrict adult access to the material; and 
(ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the 
banned material. "278 
justice O'Connor proceeded to discuss the "unzoneable" na-
ture of cyberspace.279 In comparing prior case law with Reno,2Bll jus-
tice O'Connor stated that previous zoning laws existed "in the phys-
ical world, a world with two characteristics that make it possible to 
create 'adult zones': geography and identity. "281 These characteristics 
allow owners to exclude minors from their establishments without 
affecting the First Amendment rights of adults.282 
Adults are unduly affected by the CDA provisions because these 
two principles---geography and identity---do not exist in cyber-
space.283 justice O'Connor recognized the future possibility of con-
structing barriers on the Internet to screen user identification, thus 
making cyberspace potentially zoneable.284 However, these advance-
ments have not been fully developed, nor were th~y available to all 
Internet users at the time Reno was decided.28S As a result, this tech-
nology did not save the "display" provision, section 223 (d)(l)(B) , 
from constitutional failure.286 Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with 
the majority that this section of the CDA caused speakers to com-
pletely refrain from using indecent speech, and as a result, unduly 
affected the First Amendment rights of adults.287 
Sections 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d)(l)(A) were the subject of 
justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion because she reasoned that 
they were not unconstitutional in every application.288 justice 
O'Connor noted that for section 223(a)(1)(B) to apply, the infor-
mation sender must have known the recipient was under eighteen 
278. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
279. See id. at 2353-54 (O·Connor. j., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
280. See id. at 2353 (O'Connor, j.. concurring in part. dissenting in part). 
281. Id. 
282. See id. 
283. See id. 
284. See id. 
285. See id. at 2353-54. (O'Connor, j.. concurring in part. dissenting in part). These 
advancements are known as "gateway" technology. and includes adult verifica-
tion numbers, screening software such as Cyber Patrol and SurfWatch, and 
Web browsers with screening capabilities. See id. 
286. See id. at 2354 (O·Connor. j.. concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
287. See id. 
288. See id. 
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years 01d.289 Justice O'Connor opined that section 223(d) should be 
construed to require this knowledge as well, even though this re-
quirement was lacking from the language of the statute.290 Justice 
O'Connor reasoned that when the provisions were read to require 
knowledge, they would be no different than the statute in Ginsberg 
as applied to a conversation between an adult and a minor.291 
However, when more than one adult participates in a conversa-
tion that is subsequently joined by a minor, the Ginsberg 292 analogy 
is destroyed because the CDA requires adults to cease using inde-
cent speech immediate1y.293 Therefore, in this situation, the CDA 
provisions restrict the rights of adults to use indecent speech over 
the Internet.294 However, when an adult's constitutional right to en-
gage in indecent speech would not normally be affected by a stat-
ute, a facial challenge to the statute will faiJ.295 As a result, the 
Court has the authority to strike, as unconstitutional, portions of 
the CDA as they pertain to communications between adults and up-
hold those same provisions as they pertain to communications in-
volving minors.296 Based on this authority, Justice O'Connor "sus-
tain [ed] the 'indecency transmission' and 'specific person' 
provisions to the extent they apply to the transmission of Internet 
communications where the party initiating the communication 
knows that all of the recipients are minors. "297 
289. See id. 
290. See id. 
291. See id. at 2355 ("Restricting what the adult may say to the minors in no way re-
stricts the adult's ability to communicate with other adults. He is not pre-
vented from speaking indecently to other adults in a chat room (because 
there are no other adults participating in the conversation) and he remains 
free to send indecent e-mails to other adults.") (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
292. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text. 
293. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). "If they did not, they could be prosecuted under the 'indecency trans-
mission' and 'specific person' provisions for any indecent statements they 
make to the group, since they would be transmitting an indecent message to 
specific persons, one of whom is a minor." Id. 
294. See id. 
295. See ill. ; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that 
a facial challenge to legislation succeeds only if the challenger shows that no 
circumstances exist under which the statute is valid). . 
296. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, litc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985». 
297. Id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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Justice O'Connor then analyzed the COA under the second 
prong of the valid zoning law inquiry, which is whether the statute 
interferes with minors' First Amendment rights.298 She concluded 
that "the CDA does not burden a substantial amount of minors' 
constitutionally protected speech. "299 Justice O'Connor referred to 
Ginsberg in which the Court determined that minors may be denied 
access to certain material deemed obscene as to minors, and estab-
lished the test for determining what materials fall into this cate-
gory.300 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the CDA could potentially 
ban speech that minors have a constitutional right to access because 
Congress failed to clarify what constitutes "patently offensive" 
speech under the COA 301 This potential interference, however, was 
not enough for plaintiffs to successfully prove that the COA was 
overbroad.302 Justice O'Connor observed that the plaintiffs simply 
failed to prove substantial overbreadth concerning minors' speech 
rights, and thus a facial challenge of the CDA should fai1.303 Justice 
O'Connor concluded, under the zoning law analysis, the "display," 
"indecency transmission," and "specific person" provisions were un-
constitutional as applied to communications between adults.304 How-
ever, the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions 
were constitutionally valid as applied to communications between an 
adult and one or more minors, and thus those portions of the stat-
ute should be upheld as constitutiona1.30S 
Justice O'Connor's concurring and dissenting opinion provided 
an alternative overbreadth analysis of the COA306 This reasoning ad-
heres to the principle that a statute may be declared unconstitu-
tional in part, but otherwise left intact.307 Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion accurately demonstrates a flexible, realistic approach to 
298. See id. 
299. Id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
300. See id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
301. See id. An example of speech that a minor has a right to access, but would be 
banned by the CDA, is any speech that has some redeeming value for minors 
and does not appeal to their prurient interest. See itl. 
302. See id. "Our cases require a proof of 'real' and 'substantial' overbreadth." Id. 
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973». 
303. See id. 
304. See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
305. See id. 
306. See supra notes 271-304 and accompanying text. 
307. See Rerw, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985». 
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determining the constitutionality of statutes, which effectively pre-
serves the congressional intent behind such legislation. 
C. Impact of Reno v. ACLU 
In Reno v. ACLU, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the framework for conducting a constitutional analysis of overbroad 
legislative enactments under the First Amendment. 308 The effect of 
this designed constitutional inquiry is twofold: (1) overbroad legisla-
tion that the Court strictly scrutinizes will be deemed unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment if it chills protected free speech, 
unless Congress narrowly tailors the provision so that the statute in-
fringes such rights in the least intrusive way possible, and (2) Con-
gress is forced to carefully investigate the subject matter of a statute 
to ensure the means for avoiding legislative overbreadth are clearly 
available to all who may fall within the reach of the statutory lan-
guage in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. 
It would be difficult to argue that the result of the Reno deci-
sion surprised First Amendment scholars, especially in light of Sa-
ble.300 Although the version of the CDA in Sable created a complete 
ban on indecent material, and thus is facially distinguishable from 
the version of the CDA at issue in Reno, the facts in Reno illustrate 
that the CDA created a total ban on constitutionally protected 
speech.310 Congress failed to document that the technology existed 
for the ·CDA, in its current form, to pass constitutional scrutiny.3I1 
According to the information before the Court, there was no viable 
age verification process to protect information providers, and there-
fore the statutory affirmative defenses were not an effective means 
to avoid prosecution.312 Thus, the cumulative effect of all these fac-
tors created an identical restriction on speech as did the statute that 
was at issue in Sable.313 
The Reno decision directly benefits Internet users who choose 
to provide indecent material to others. The Supreme Court ex-
pressly stated that the Internet deserves far more protection from 
regulation than does broadcasting.314 Therefore, it is highly proba-
ble that potential Internet regulation supporters will be unable to 
308. See supra notes 170-270 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text. 
310. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347-50. 
311. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
312. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50. 
313. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text. 
314. See. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 
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draw any support from prior cases upholding the regulation of 
broadcast media. This reduces the amount of legal authority at 
their disposal and greatly reduces the chances of mounting success-
ful defenses against the constitutional challenges to Internet 
regulations. 
On the other hand, Reno does provide hope for those who sup-
port regulating the Internet. Once computer software is available to 
the average Internet user that allows persons to verify the age of a 
recipient, statutes such as the CDA will enjoy greater judicial sup-
port. This software will allow an Internet user wishing to send inde-
cent messages to be reasonably sure that another user with whom 
the individual is communicating is an adult. This assurance will al-
low people to communicate with one another without the threat of 
prosecution under a statute that regulates communication, thus 
avoiding forced silence upon people and violations of the First 
Amendment. Until such software is available to all Internet users, 
whether commercial or non-commercial, legislation seeking to regu-
late protected speech communicated over this medium of commu-
nication will not succeed. 
Reno also affected the contemporary political arena, compelling 
the legislative and executive branches to carefully consider First 
Amendment values as they create and administer regulations of the 
Internet.31S Within six months of the Court's decision in Reno, Vice 
President AI Gore announced that the Clinton administration would 
join members of the online industry to form "Kids Online," a na-
tional effort to make the Internet and online services "safer for chil-
dren. "316 Rather than calling for increased regulation of the In-
315. See infra notes 314-22 and accompanying text. 
316. Kids Online to get Administration Support, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 2, 1997, available in 
1997 WL 13781115. Participating members of the online industry include 
America Online, the American Library Association, the WaIt Disney Company, 
and Time Warner, Inc. See id. Each company will design and provide its own 
protective program for children. See id. Additionally, Gore praised the "use of 
Internet blocking and screening," and stated that the "use of such devices by 
parents 'is not censorship.'" Gore at Summit Conference Sets Kids Online Policy, 
CoMM. DAILY, Dec. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13781201. Gore further com-
mented: "It's called 'parenting,' and blocking was 'fully protected' by the First 
Amendment." It! Furthermore, Gore praised "Web sites that have started to 
rate themselves and the online industry for its decision to adopt a formal pol-
icy statement showing 'zero tolerance' for child pornography and that In-
ternet service providers will 'be working closely with law enforcement to re-
port and pursue any suspicious activity. '" Id. 
314 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
ternet,317 the Clinton Administration's cooperative approach to the 
problems posed by indecent material on the Internet reflects a real-
ization that only with the online industry's cooperation can there be 
effective restrictions without a "nationwide backlash" occurring 
"that could stunt the growth of [the] Internet."318 Along with par-
ents,319 this coalition will.move toward strengthening the Reno 
majority's conclusion that Internet-filtering software is a viable alter-
native to a complete ban of indecent speech. 
D. Congressional IWponse 
The Reno Court was mainly concerned with two characteristics 
of the CDA.320 First, the CDA covered commercial and non-
commercial information providers and applied the same level of lia-
bility to these two categories.321 Second, the CDA failed to provide 
any definition of "indecent" and omitted the requirement that "pa-
tently offensive" material must lack socially redeeming value.322 In 
response to these concerns, the legislative branch of the federal 
317. Vice President Gore was quick to· recognize that this program "should follow 
dictates of court decisions and [the] Constitution." [d. Gore attacked groups 
that support increased government involvement, stating "that government has 
to follow court rulings and 'we must find methods to keep our children safe 
that do not infringe on the free speech of others .... [d. 
318. [d. The administration openly supported a "3rd way" policy that calls for in-
dustry lead~rs to work alongside the government in solving the present 
problems with children and the Internet. See id. 
319. Some would contend that Reno shifts the responsibility of keeping children 
away from sexuall~xplicit material on the Internet to parents. See Ann Gre-
gor, Filtering Software Can Help Make Surfing Safer for Kids, HOME PC, Nov. I, 
1997, available in 1997 WL 2968922. This responsibility has spurred a move-
ment in the online industry to develop new and improved Internet-filtering 
software. See id. Several examples of available programs parents can use to ac-
complish this task are Microsystems' Cyber Patrol, Solid Oak Software's Cyber-
Sitter, Net Nanny Ltd.'s Net Nanny, Spyglass's SurfWatch, and Security 
Software Systems' Cyber Sentinel. See id. These programs all share certain simi-
larities so that: 
[d. 
As children surf, the filters compare what's streaming into the com-
puter against lists of proscribed words, phrases and Internet ad-
dresses. If the software finds a match, the page won't appear on-
screen. Some programs get parents started with extensive lists of un-
desirable sites; others rely more on users to create their own lists, cit-
ing the vast differences in what parents consider objectionable. 
320. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2324, 2345, 2347 (1997). 
321. See ill. at 2347. 
322. See ill. at 2345. 
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government accepted the Supreme Court's challenge issued in 
Reno. The United States Senate Commerce Committee approved 
Senate Bill 1482, a bill written by Senator Dan Coats of Indiana that 
amends section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, and is "de-
signed to prevent indecent material from being conveyed over the 
Internet" to people under seventeen years old.323 Senate Bill 1482 is 
known as the Internet Indecency Act, and it outlaws the commercial 
distribution of pornography over the Internet to minors.324 
The Internet Indecency Act appears to be a reincarnation of 
the Communications Decency Act designed to withstand constitu-
tional challenge. "325 Senate Bill 1482 is modeled after the New York 
statute that the Supreme Court upheld in Ginsberg v. New York with 
323. Senate Panel OK's School Filtering, Internet Decency Bills, Funds NGI, EDUC. TECH. 
NEWS, Mar. 18, 1998, availahle in 1998 WL 10242373. 
324. S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1998) provides: 
It! 
Section 1. Prohibition on Commercial Distribution on the World 
Wide Web of Material that is Harmful to Minors. (a) Prohibition- (1) 
IN GENERAL - Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 
U.S.C. 223) is amended -(A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), 
(g), and (h) as subsections (f),(g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (B) 
by inserting after subsection (d) the following new section (e): (e) 
(1) Whoever in interstate or foreign commerce in or through the 
World Wide Web is engaged in the business of the commercial distri-
bution of material that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to 
such material by persons under 17 years of age. (2) Any person who 
violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not more than $50,000, impris-
oned not more than six months, or both ... (5)it is an affirmative de-
fense to prosecution under this subsection that the defendant re-
stricted access to material that is harmful to minors persons under 17 
years of age by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, 
adult access code, or adult personal identification number or in ac-
cordance with such other procedures as the Commission may pre-
scribe. (6) This subsection may not be construed to author the Com-
mission to regulate in any manner the content of information 
provided on the World Wide Web. (7) For purposes of this subsec-
tion: (A) The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any 
communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, 
writing, or other matter of any kind that -(i) takeri as a whole and 
with respect to minors, appeal to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion; (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive 
way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated 
sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted 
sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (iii) lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
325. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
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the Reno Court's remarks in mind.326 The statute in Ginsberg pro-
hibited the selling to minors under seventeen years of age material 
considered obscene as to minors but not to adults.327 
In Reno, the Supreme Court found four primary differences be-
tween the CDA and the Ginsberg statute,328 all of which Senate Bill 
1482 clearly addresses.329 First, like the statute in Ginsberg,3'30 Senate 
Bill 1482 does not prohibit parents from obtaining material on the 
Internet for their children,331 unlike section 223(a)(2) of the CDA 
which criminalized such parental activity.332 Second, the scope of 
Senate Bill 1482 is clearly limited to commercial transactions333 as 
was the statute upheld in Ginsberg.334 The CDA was directed at both 
commercial and non-commercial activity.33S Third, the Ginsberg stat-
ute's "harmful to minors" standard included the requirement that 
the material "lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value," thus protecting material containing any of these serious 
value elements.336 Section (e)(7) of Senate Bill 1482 specifically 
adopts this requirement of the Ginsberg statute.337 On the other 
hand, the CDA did not contain a definition of "indecent" or a "so-
cial value" exception to the "patently offensive" provision.338 Lastly, 
the Ginsberg statute defined minors as people under the age of sev-
enteen,339 and Senate Bill 1482 adopts the same definition of mi-
nors.34O In contrast, the scope of the CDA included eighteen-year-
0Ids.341 
Furthermore, Senate Bill 1482 provides the narrow-tailoring 
that the Court has required in the past when testing the constitu-
tionality of legislation.342 Section (e)(5) of the bill provides certain 
326. See supra notes 3144 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
328. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. 
329. See infra notes 33041 and accompanying text. 
330. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra note 324. 
332. See supra note 5. 
333. See supra note 324. 
334. See supra note 85 and accompanying 'text. 
335. See supra note 5. 
336. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra note 324. 
338. See supra note 5. 
339. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra note 5. 
342. See supra notes 32-132 and accompanying text. 
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affirmative defenses343 that the Reno Court acknowledged as both 
technically and economically feasible for commercial information 
providers.344 The scope of Senate Bill 1482 is explicitly limited to 
commercial activity on the World Wide Web, and therefore the af-
firmative defenses will protect those providers who follow its terms 
from prosecution.345 Senate Bill 1482 is specifically designed to meet 
the parameters established by the Supreme Court in past deci-
sions346 and appears to be constitutional under the First Amend-
ment because of its adherence to the Court's commands in both 
Reno and Ginsberg. This Bill eventually became part of the Child On-
line Protection Act (COPA)347 and was immediately challenged.348 
343. See supra note 324. 
344. See supra note 255. 
345. See supra note 342. 
346. See supra notes 32841 and accompanying text. 
347. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1999). 
348. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999); ACLU v. Reno, 1998 
WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998). The ACLU represented individuals, enti-
ties, organizations, World Wide Web site operators, and content providers that 
post, read, and respond to Web sites with information on obstetrics, gynecol-
ogy, and sexual health. See Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484. The plaintiffs argued 
that the statute was unconstitutional for the same reasons as CDA-a restric-
tion on speech "harmful to minors" burdens speech that is protected for 
adults. See id. at 478-79. Just before the COPA was about to go into effect, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a 
temporary restraining order. See Reno, 1998 WL 813423 at *1. The court later 
granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the statute 
until a final adjudication of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. See Reno, 31 F. 
Supp. 2d at 499. The court held that the plaintiffs established "a substantial 
likelihood that they will be able to show that COPA imposes a burden on free 
speech that is protected for adults." Id. at 495. Like the Interent Indecency 
Act, the district court and commentators recognized that COPA was clearly 
Congress' response to the Supreme Court striking down the CDA in Reno v. 
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). See, e.g., Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77; Pierre J. 
Lorieau, Reno v. ACLU: Champion of Free Speech ur Blueprint fur Speech Regulation 
on the Internetr, 7 J.L. POL'y 209, 247 (1998); Richard Raysman and Peter 
Brown, Regulating Internet Content, Privacy; Taxes, N.Y.LJ. Sept. 21, 1998, at 1. 
For example, the COPA explicitly defines "material that is harmful to minors," 
using some of the Supreme Court's criticisms of Reno. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (6). 
While the CDA used general terms such as "indecent" and "patently offen-
sive" to describe material harmful to minors, the COPA incorporated specific 
guidelines, such as a lack of serious literary, political, or scientific value for 
minors. for courts to consider. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(I)(B) (1998) 
(CDA). with 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1999) (COPA). Furthermore. while the 
CDA regulated distribution of materials to eighteen-year-olds, the COPA ap-
plies only to material distributed to individuals seventeen years old and 
